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Practical Friendship Program · Domain #3 — Strategic Stability + Non-Proliferation

Six decades.
One thermometer.

The bilateral US-RF arms control architecture has produced the longest continuous strategic-restraint regime in history. From the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) through New START's expiration on February 5, 2026, the two states have maintained continuous treaty-based limits on the most consequential category of weapons humanity has built. This domain is currently the most atrophied of any Practical Friendship Program lane. It is also the one with the highest mutual cost of failure.

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★ Current state — public record

New START expired 2026-02-05.

The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev; extended 2021 by Presidents Biden and Putin) reached its terminal date on February 5, 2026. As of publication, no formally agreed successor framework has entered into force.

This is the first period in over half a century in which no bilateral strategic-arms treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation has been in legal effect. The previous gap closed faster than the current one.

NIGHTBOX's editorial position: this is the single most consequential bilateral cooperation gap on the table. Closing it is the boring legal work that delivers the largest mutual welfare gain available in the entire US-RF policy space.

Six decades of treaty architecture — public-record timeline

The treaty record is dense and continuous. Every instrument below is a documented bilateral or multilateral agreement with both states as parties. Green = currently in force. Amber = signed but not in force / suspended. Red = expired or withdrawn.

1963
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) IN FORCE
Bans nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. Multilateral, US and USSR/RF both parties.
1968
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) IN FORCE
Foundational global non-proliferation treaty. US and USSR/RF both among the five recognized nuclear-weapon states. Reviewed every five years.
1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) US WITHDREW 2002
Bilateral limit on missile-defense deployments. United States withdrew 2002.
1974
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) IN FORCE
Bilateral limit on yield of underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons. Both states bound.
1976
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) IN FORCE
Companion to TTBT for non-military explosions. Both states bound.
1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) EXPIRED 2019
Reagan-Gorbachev. Eliminated all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles in the 500-5500 km range. US withdrew 2019; Russia formally ended same year.
1991
START I EXPIRED 2009
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Bush 41 + Gorbachev. Reduced deployed warheads on each side by ~80%. Replaced by SORT then New START.
1991-2014
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction DISCONTINUED 2014
Multi-decade bilateral nuclear-material security program. Helped denuclearize Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine after 1991. Concluded 2014.
1992
Open Skies Treaty US WITHDREW 2020, RF 2021
Mutual aerial surveillance flights for confidence-building. Now lapsed for both states.
1996
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) NOT IN FORCE
Bans all nuclear explosions. US has signed but not ratified. RF ratified 2000, then de-ratified November 2023. Treaty remains not-in-force globally.
2002
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT / Moscow) SUPERSEDED 2011
Bush 43 + Putin. Capped deployed strategic warheads at 1,700-2,200 each. Superseded by New START in 2011.
2010
New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05
Obama + Medvedev. Capped each side at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed delivery vehicles, 800 deployed + non-deployed launchers. Extended 2021 (Biden + Putin). Mutual on-site inspections paused 2020 (COVID); RF formally suspended participation Feb 2023.
2015
JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal) FRAGMENTED
P5+1 including both US and RF. US withdrew 2018; remaining parties continued partial implementation. Demonstrates that bilateral US-RF coordination on non-proliferation can be effective even within larger multilateral frames.
2017
Geneva Strategic Stability Dialogue framework PAUSED 2022
Bilateral channel for arms-control consultation outside formal treaty texts. Active 2017-2022. Re-engagement is editorially recommended.

What is still in force

Even at the current low ebb, multiple foundational instruments remain legally binding on both states.

NPT (1968)

Both US and RF parties. Foundation of the global non-proliferation regime. 191 states signatories.

PTBT (1963)

Atmospheric, outer-space, underwater test ban. Multilateral, both states bound.

TTBT (1974)

150-kt limit on underground tests. Bilateral, both states bound.

PNET (1976)

Companion to TTBT. Bilateral, both states bound.

BWC (1972)

Biological Weapons Convention. Both states parties.

CWC (1993)

Chemical Weapons Convention. Both states parties.

IAEA Statute (1957)

International Atomic Energy Agency. Both states founding members. Continuous technical cooperation.

UN Security Council P5

Both states permanent members. Joint vetoes and joint votes on non-proliferation matters across decades.

The two structural facts that don't change

Whatever the political weather, two facts about the bilateral strategic relationship remain mathematically true:

  1. The two states hold ~90% of the world's nuclear warheads. Approximate counts: ~5,500 US, ~5,900 RF. China is ~600 and rising; UK, France, India, Pakistan, Israel, DPRK each in the hundreds or below. Any meaningful global arms control passes through bilateral US-RF coordination first.
  2. Their strategic interests in non-proliferation overlap completely. Neither state benefits from additional nuclear-weapon states. Both have voted P5-consensus on Iran (E3+EU+P5+1), North Korea (multiple UNSC resolutions), and Libya disarmament. Their bilateral non-proliferation alignment has been continuous for sixty years.

This is the substantive base. The political surface oscillates; the structural interest does not.

What an editorial activation looks like

NIGHTBOX does not propose specific treaty-text language — that work belongs to State, the Arms Control & International Security bureau, the National Security Council, and their RF counterparts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DSPM) and at Rosatom. What we advocate, editorially, is the process of re-engagement:

  1. Re-open the Geneva Strategic Stability Dialogue. It paused in 2022 with established working agenda. Re-opening it is a procedural step, not a concession.
  2. Initiate New-START-successor talks publicly. Even framework-level discussion produces a confidence-building artifact. Public agenda-setting matters even when sealed talks have to follow.
  3. Reactivate the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). The treaty-implementation working body that operated 2010-2026 under New START. Its technical staff and protocols exist in working memory.
  4. Restart the P5 Process on nuclear-weapon-state coordination (US, RF, UK, France, China). Reduces the multilateral friction surface even when bilateral negotiations move slowly.
  5. Coordinate at IAEA on Iran, DPRK, peaceful-uses. The institutional channels for non-proliferation cooperation are continuously active. Use them.

Scope discipline

What this exhibit is: a public-record editorial documentation of the bilateral US-RF strategic-stability architecture, its current state of atrophy, and the boring institutional channels through which re-engagement would proceed. Published under CC BY 4.0 by a Wyoming LLC.

What lives outside the scope of this exhibit and of NIGHTBOX's company scope generally:
  • Specific treaty-text language or term advocacy
  • Any analysis of classified, sensitive, or controlled nuclear-program information
  • Any commentary on either state's force posture, declaratory policy, or operational doctrine
  • Any role in track-1 (state-to-state) or track-1.5 (semi-official) arms control proceedings
  • Any private actor role in the implementation, verification, or monitoring of any nuclear instrument
Wyoming LLCs document. They advocate process re-engagement at the editorial level. The substantive arms-control work belongs to State Department, NSC, Pentagon, MFA, Rosatom, IAEA, and the Bilateral Consultative Commission. NIGHTBOX advocates that all of those bodies be put back into the same room.

The boring channel is the only channel.

The reason strategic stability cooperation has worked for sixty years across every adversarial period — Cuba 1962, Vietnam, Afghanistan 1979, Able Archer 1983, post-1991 transition, post-9/11 friction, post-2014 friction, post-2022 friction — is that the alternative is unthinkable in a way the participants on both sides have always understood. The treaties were never a favor. They were a mutual welfare instrument. The current architectural gap is also mutual. Closing it is the most consequential bilateral move available.

Doctrine published 2026-05-19. CC BY 4.0. NIGHTBOX LLC, Wyoming, USA. Contact: artem@nightboxllc.com.