The bilateral US-RF arms control architecture has produced the longest continuous strategic-restraint regime in history. From the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) through New START's expiration on February 5, 2026, the two states have maintained continuous treaty-based limits on the most consequential category of weapons humanity has built. This domain is currently the most atrophied of any Practical Friendship Program lane. It is also the one with the highest mutual cost of failure.
The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev; extended 2021 by Presidents Biden and Putin) reached its terminal date on February 5, 2026. As of publication, no formally agreed successor framework has entered into force.
This is the first period in over half a century in which no bilateral strategic-arms treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation has been in legal effect. The previous gap closed faster than the current one.
NIGHTBOX's editorial position: this is the single most consequential bilateral cooperation gap on the table. Closing it is the boring legal work that delivers the largest mutual welfare gain available in the entire US-RF policy space.
The treaty record is dense and continuous. Every instrument below is a documented bilateral or multilateral agreement with both states as parties. Green = currently in force. Amber = signed but not in force / suspended. Red = expired or withdrawn.
Even at the current low ebb, multiple foundational instruments remain legally binding on both states.
Both US and RF parties. Foundation of the global non-proliferation regime. 191 states signatories.
Atmospheric, outer-space, underwater test ban. Multilateral, both states bound.
150-kt limit on underground tests. Bilateral, both states bound.
Companion to TTBT. Bilateral, both states bound.
Biological Weapons Convention. Both states parties.
Chemical Weapons Convention. Both states parties.
International Atomic Energy Agency. Both states founding members. Continuous technical cooperation.
Both states permanent members. Joint vetoes and joint votes on non-proliferation matters across decades.
Whatever the political weather, two facts about the bilateral strategic relationship remain mathematically true:
This is the substantive base. The political surface oscillates; the structural interest does not.
NIGHTBOX does not propose specific treaty-text language — that work belongs to State, the Arms Control & International Security bureau, the National Security Council, and their RF counterparts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DSPM) and at Rosatom. What we advocate, editorially, is the process of re-engagement:
The reason strategic stability cooperation has worked for sixty years across every adversarial period — Cuba 1962, Vietnam, Afghanistan 1979, Able Archer 1983, post-1991 transition, post-9/11 friction, post-2014 friction, post-2022 friction — is that the alternative is unthinkable in a way the participants on both sides have always understood. The treaties were never a favor. They were a mutual welfare instrument. The current architectural gap is also mutual. Closing it is the most consequential bilateral move available.
Doctrine published 2026-05-19. CC BY 4.0. NIGHTBOX LLC, Wyoming, USA. Contact: artem@nightboxllc.com.